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I.

Introduction

As companies have increased their international presence, cross-border insolvency has
become more prevalent. Companies have formed complex corporate groups which contain many
subsidiaries in multiple countries, each owning different assets. The growing convolution of
companies’ corporate structures has led to more intricate cross-border insolvencies involving
additional countries. Transnational insolvency has several problems, including forum selection,
enforcement of judgments, and creditor rights, but the various cross-border insolvency regimes
create major issues among countries. Countries have different cross-border insolvency policies for
the assets within their border, but universalism and territoriality represent the two overarching
regimes.
This paper analyzes the cross-border insolvency regimes of the United States, Singapore,
and Hong Kong as case studies of the different systems. The United States utilizes a universalism
regime which requires the countries with the company’s assets to transfer them to the main court
proceeding. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Singapore’s old territoriality system allows the
country’s courts to apply its local insolvency laws without deferring to other proceedings. Earlier
this year, Singapore changed its insolvency statute to a universalism system, but this paper will
use Singapore’s old regime to represent the other territoriality countries.1 Hong Kong utilizes
modified universalism, which incorporates certain aspects of both territoriality and universalism.
I recently visited Hong Kong and Singapore on the school’s International Immersion
Program where I learned about the territories’ legal systems and spoke with professionals. This
paper will analyze the insolvency of the hypothetical company DroneCo to discuss how cross-

1

Companies (Amendment) Act (Cap 50, 2017 Rev Ed)
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border insolvencies operate in each of the three territories. By analyzing the differences among the
territories, the reader will better understand the effect of the various transnational insolvency
regimes and the creditors’ disparate outcomes.
The paper will also analyze potential policy changes in each territory, including
Singapore’s decision to move to a universalism regime. Each territory’s unique issues either limit
or encourage changes to its insolvency regimes. Countries should realize that the signaling effect
of their decision to adopt a different type of regime might affect external factors—such as foreign
direct investments—more than the statute’s actual effects.
II.

Cross-Border Insolvency Regimes
a. Singapore’s Old Territorial Approach

Singapore’s old Companies Act contained the territorial cross-border insolvency
provisions.2 The main tenant of territoriality is that the country uses its own cross-border
insolvency laws without deferring to other countries’ laws. With Singapore, the country’s statutes
provided more financial support for the creditors within the country over other cross-border
insolvency regimes. In practice, however, Singapore’s old system had recently relied upon
common law principles that resulted in a system more akin to a modified universalism regime.
For a country of such small size, Singapore’s decision to institute the initial territorialism
regime earned the country many advantages. This system alleviated the need for the Singaporean
courts to worry about foreign proceedings or recognize other judgments, which led to easier
dispositions of claims. The local debtors also obtained a higher percentage of the insolvency award
which would increase the likelihood they loan money to Singaporean businesses.

2

Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed)
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Some commentators have called territoriality the “Grab Rule” as local creditors have
legitimate expectations that potential issues are resolved using local policies.3 Proponents of
territoriality argue that local creditors likely contribute most to the debtor’s business and, therefore,
should receive money first. While this may have been true when Singapore became a country in
1962, Singapore’s reign as one of the main centers for the global economy means transnational
insolvency cases receive investments from international institutions.
Importantly, Singapore relies on English case law for various areas of law, including
insolvency. The Application of the English Law Act states that the common law of England
continues to be the law of Singapore.4 This act treats as binding both English and Australian court
decisions before November 12, 1993. Cases and common law principles after that date are highly
persuasive; they become binding only when a Singapore court applies the decision.
The government provided multiple reasons for Singapore’s decision to move from a
territoriality regime to adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency (“Model
Law”). On March 30, 2017, the Companies Amendment Bill became law, which changed
Singapore’s territoriality system into universalism.5 Although the bill has been signed, even an
efficient country like Singapore cannot institute the amendment immediately. The country has
implemented a grace period for lawyers and companies to understand the new policy.
b. United States’ Universalism
The United States universalism exists on the other side of the cross-border insolvency
spectrum. Universalism states that Court A—and any other courts dealing with the company’s

3

Leah Barteld, Cross-Border Bankruptcy and the Cooperative Solution, 9 B.Y.U. Int'l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 27 (2012)
Companies Act (Cap 7A, 1994 Ed) s 3(1)
5
Companies (Amendment) Act (Cap 50, 2017 Rev Ed)
4
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assets within its jurisdiction—should transfer the ability to deal with those assets to Court B where
the main proceeding occurs.6 Court B can then make a unified distribution to creditors regardless
of their location. Universalism’s central idea provides the judge of the main proceeding with the
ability to make a more equitable allocation of resources as the court has more of the company’s
assets at its disposal.
United States’ universalism regime adopted the Model Law. Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy
Code adopts the Model Law nearly verbatim. Unlike other statutes, the introductory section of
Chapter 15 details the rationale and benefits of adopting the Model Law. 7 These ideas reflect the
specific reasons for adopting the universalism regime, including cooperation, legal certainty,
fairness, maximizing value of debtor’s assets, and rescuing financially troubled businesses.8 Fortytwo other territories subscribe to the Model Law.9 From an American perspective, the benefits of
universalism provide certainty regarding bankruptcy laws to the corporations that conduct business
in the country.
c. Hong Kong’s Modified Universalism
A description of Hong Kong’s insolvency regime must begin with a better understanding
of its legal and political history. Hong Kong was nominally under British rule until 1997 but had
retained political and legal autonomy during this period. In 1997, the official handover to the
People’s Republic of China (“China”) occurred, making Hong Kong a Special Administrative
Region of China.

6

John J. Chung, The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Lesson from Maritime Law, 17
Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 262-263 (2007)
7
Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) s 1501(a)
8
Id.
9
Status of UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html (last visited May 15, 2017).
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The handover created questions about how Hong Kong’s previously autonomous political
and legal system would later overlap with China but instead proposed to review these issues in
2047. The situation in Hong Kong has been best described as “one country, two systems,” which
emphasizes Hong Kong’s involvement with China while addressing the obvious differences.
Hong Kong’s insolvency regime falls between the extremes of territoriality and
universalism in a form called modified universalism. This idea starts with universalism and then
moves towards the other end of the spectrum, depending on the amount of territoriality. As
discussed later in this paper, Hong Kong’s regime is closer to Singapore’s written territorialism
statutes than the United States’ universalism. Hong Kong’s insolvency laws are in Chapter 32 of
the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (the “Companies
Ordinance”).10
Modified universalism allows Hong Kong to reap the benefits of both regimes. The
territory can cooperate with other countries during insolvency proceedings, but courts are not
forced to cooperate. Hong Kong also can invoke the provisions that protect the creditors within its
borders by utilizing the company’s assets within the territory. Similar to territoriality, not all
countries agree with the concept of universalism, which provides Hong Kong with a huge benefit.
Hong Kong’s position as a major center of international business has created many multinational
corporations in the territory and even more international lending.
While learning about each regime in the abstract is instructive, the paper will analyze the
hypothetical cross-border insolvency of DroneCo to portray the practical concerns of each
territory.

10

Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32) (2016)
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III.

The Cross-Border Insolvency of DroneCo
a. DroneCo’s Initial Success

This paper will discuss the three territories’ insolvency regimes by walking through a crossborder insolvency of the hypothetical company, DroneCo. DroneCo was the New Zealand creation
of Bird Wellington—one of the world’s foremost engineers—who created DroneCo to
manufacture drones for businesses and civilians. The company’s humble roots began in Bird’s
garage as he personally manufactured the drones. Corporations quickly bought DroneCo’s drones
for aerial photography, especially for construction and farming zones.
After gaining traction selling his drones in small batches throughout the country, Bird
obtained his initial $20 million loan from SCLoanCo to create a large drone factory in New
Zealand. After realizing that lenders would provide him with capital due to his experience and
nascent success, he took another $15 million loan from UCLoanCo to manufacture the drone
materials necessary to increase the company’s ability to control production. Both SCLoanCo and
UCLoanCo are New Zealand based banks. DroneCo paid off only the interest of each loan
throughout the relevant period, so the company still owed the entire loan amount.
Bird did not read his loan agreements; rather, he passed the job off to his general counsel,
Tom. Tom had little experience with loan documents, but he realized the loan agreements came in
two varieties. The loan from SCLoanCo had a lower interest rate and held a security interest in the
valuable drone manufacturing equipment. The loans for the other facilities came from UCLoanCo,
which charged a much higher interest rate without holding a security interest in the custom material
manufacturing equipment.

8

b. Expansion
After a successful initial few years in New Zealand, Bird knew he had to stay ahead of the
competition by creating a new version of his most popular aerial photography drone. While
DroneCo had succeeded, the company did not have the capital to invest heavily in research and
development for the new drone. Bird realized that he could get money from multiple banks, which
would cover the costs of his research. Bird received $3 million loans each from HKLoanCo,
USLoanCo, and SingLoanCo, which were banks in Hong Kong, United States, and Singapore,
respectively. Bird used the company’s strong name to obtain unsecured loans with higher interest
rates.
Some confidential details about the company had leaked, so Bird could not trust the
development to his entire engineering team. DroneCo sunk every penny of the loan to develop
three state-of-art aerial photography drones which could maneuver better around construction
zones. Bird found three willing clients in the midst of complex construction in Hong Kong,
Singapore, and the United States who were happy to test his new drones for a small fee. Bird
personally oversaw the development of the three new construction photography drones called
HKDrone, SingDrone, and USDrone (collectively, the “CPDrones”).
c. Problems
After its initial success, DroneCo faced major obstacles. Bird supposedly located his office
within the manufacturing plant in New Zealand to ensure quality. But, his workers began a sexual
harassment lawsuit because the workers alleged that Bird walked around the factory in his
underwear and made lewd remarks towards them. Tom knew even less about PR than law, which
kept DroneCo in the media longer than necessary. While the case was eventually thrown out, the
negative media attention drastically slowed the company’s sales.

9

DroneCo also faced increasing costs when the New Zealand government passed laws to
increase the minimum wage. Because DroneCo’s located all of its factories in New Zealand, the
company needed to invest heavily to move its manufacturing to another country. Additionally,
Bird refused to outsource manufacturing outside of New Zealand. DroneCo could no longer pay
off the creditors, so it filed for bankruptcy in New Zealand.
d. Insolvency
DroneCo has $4 million in assets in New Zealand through its manufacturing facilities and
stock of drones and materials. Due to the secrecy behind the CPDrones’ development, Tom did
not realize that Bird had sent the CPDrones to clients. During the insolvency process in New
Zealand, Tom learned about the CPDrones in the various territories and stated they were worth
approximately $2 million each. DroneCo has no assets outside these four territories.
New Zealand has adopted the Model Law, so SCLoanCo wants to organize the company’s
proceedings in New Zealand under one main proceeding. However, HKLoanCo, SingLoanCo, and
USLoanCo want to sue within their respective countries because they believe they would receive
a higher percentage of their loans from individual sales of the CPDrones.
Two companies have shown interest in purchasing DroneCo. OpenSesame, a direct
competitor of DroneCo, wants the technology behind the CPDrones. Bezos, an online retailer of
nearly every possible product, would also like to purchase the CPDrones, and Bezos believes that
the manufacturing plants are still valuable. By creating its own generic drones, Bezos would be
one step closer to its plan of dominating every industry.
IV.

Recognition of a Foreign Proceeding

DroneCo’s decision to file bankruptcy in New Zealand will start a chain reaction for the
creditors. Each creditor will initiate insolvency proceedings within their respective jurisdictions,
10

and each court’s decision to recognize the foreign proceeding is one of the most important factors
for the eventual distribution of assets.
a. United States’ Recognition of the New Zealand Proceeding
In the universalism context, recognition of a foreign proceeding is the basis for transferring
the right to distribute assets. A United States court’s decision whether to acknowledge a foreign
proceeding depends on the facts and the limited public policy exception.
i.

Determining the Existence of Foreign Proceeding

The Model Law simplifies the decision-making process as each country agrees to recognize
the proceedings of the other signatories. A few court cases have determined factors for recognizing
foreign proceedings from countries that do not participate in the Model Law.
The leading case is In Re Betcorp, which outlines seven required elements for determining
foreign recognition.11 The most important element is whether the debtor’s assets are subject to the
control or supervision of the foreign court.12 Courts also question whether the foreign proceeding
meets the same level of fairness of a United States court.13
The decision to recognize a foreign proceeding must also pass the public policy exception.
For very few cases, a court can decline to cooperate with a foreign proceeding if recognizing the
action “would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.” 14 Courts in the
United States have narrowly interpreted the public policy exception and only invoked the

11

400 B.R. 266 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009)
Id.
13
In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Inv., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The key determination required by
this Court is whether the procedures used in Canada meet our fundamental standards of fairness.”)
14
11 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (West)
12
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protection in extreme circumstances.15 However in Jaffe v. Samsung Elec. Co., the Fourth Circuit
broadly invoked the public policy defense when discretionary relief under § 1521 would have
imposed relief on other creditors not available in United States’ courts.16 A court will generally
attempt to recognize a foreign proceeding, especially one which occurs in a jurisdiction
subscribing to the Model Law.
ii. Chapter 15 and Recognizing DroneCo’s New Zealand Proceeding
Chapter 15 specifically addresses supporting other proceedings as the United States will
“cooperate to the maximum extent possible.”17 Adoption of the Model Law provides the quickest
path to recognizing other countries’ foreign proceedings due to the nearly identical provisions.
Since New Zealand also subscribes to the Model Law, the foreign representative would make a
petition seeking recognition, and the United States judge would recognize DroneCo’s New
Zealand proceeding.18 The judge would not hesitate to recognize the proceeding because there is
no public policy implication.
b. Singapore will likely recognize the New Zealand proceeding
A petition to recognize the New Zealand proceeding would fall under the discretion of the
Singapore High Court. While a Singaporean court does not have the statutory ability to recognize
a foreign proceeding, the courts have increasingly relied on common law principles to recognize
foreign proceedings.19
15

In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 198 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that the United States rarely denied recognition of
foreign proceedings when manifestly contrary to the United States’ public policy); see also In re ABC Learning
Centres Ltd., 728 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2013) (recognizing foreign proceeding even when it allowed secured creditors to
retain all of the debtor's assets instead of providing for the administration of all creditor claims)
16
737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013); In re OAS S.A., 533 B.R. 83, 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“courts are reluctant to
proscribe an action a party merely finds inconvenient, unusual or even unjust in some way”)
17
11 U.S.C.A. § 1501(a)
18
11 U.S.C.A. § 1515(a)
19
See Re China Underwriters Life and General Insurance CO [1988] 1 SLR(R) 40 (recognizing a Hong Kong
liquidator); Re Taisoo Suk (as foreign representative of Hanjin Shipping Co Ltd) [2016] 5 SLR 787 (recognizing and
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In the case of the SingDrone, the Singaporean court will likely attempt to recognize the
New Zealand proceeding. However, recognition does not guarantee it will transfer the right to
distribute assets to the New Zealand proceeding, which would allow SingLoanCo to receive
additional funds.20
c. Hong Kong’s Rules Regarding Recognition
The Companies Ordinance does not contain provisions covering the recognition of
insolvency procedures commenced in other jurisdictions. Hong Kong does not have a formal
process to assist or recognize a foreign proceeding, which makes it closer to a true territorial
regime. However, courts have been willing to recognize other proceedings in certain situations.
Hong Kong courts will generally recognize a liquidator appointed in the country of the
company’s incorporation when no public policy issues exist.21 The Companies Ordinance also
provides that the same rules will apply for the rights of unsecured and secured creditors which
have been extended to include foreign creditors as well.22 However, courts have drawn a line
between recognition of foreign liquidators and applying a foreign order.23 Even if a court
recognizes the foreign proceeding, the court has the discretion not to provide any further relief.

providing assistance to Korean proceedings); Re Opti-medix (in liquidation) [2016] SGHC 108 (“A consequence of
a greater sensitivity to universalist notions in insolvency is a greater readiness to go beyond traditional bases for
recognising foreign insolvency proceedings.”)
20
Tohru Motobayashi v. Official Receiver [2000] 3 SLR(R) 435 (recognizing a Japanese liquidator through the
Companies Act, but the court refused to allow Singaporean liquidator to remit assets of company); Re Projector SA
[2009] 2 SLR(R) 151 (allowing a foreign company to fall into same pool as local unsecured creditors, yet the debtor
did not have enough money to fully pay off secured creditors, which led to the foreign company receiving no
tangible benefit)
21
See Joint Official Liquidators of A Co v B [2014] 4 HKLRD 374
22
Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32) § 264 (2016); see also Re Moulin
Global Eyecare Trading Ltd [2007] HKCFI 747
23
Joint Administrators of African Minerals Ltd (in administration) v Madison Pacific Trust Ltd & Shandong Steel
Hong Kong Zengli Ltd [2015] HKEC 608 (stating that a court will apply stricter requirements for recognizing a
foreign order as the foreign court could proscribe relief not allowed in Hong Kong)
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i. Hong Kong May Recognize the New Zealand Proceeding
Communication among the courts occurs on a case-by-case basis, but I have no reason to
believe that the Hong Kong court would refuse to communicate.24 A Hong Kong court can refuse
to recognize a foreign proceeding if it believes that the foreign proceeding would hurt the local
creditor. HKLoanCo would stand to lose more of the award than if the Hong Kong court placed
the drone under the jurisdiction of the New Zealand court. The Hong Kong proceeding would then
focus mostly on distributing the HKDrone to the local creditors.
On the other hand, recognizing the foreign proceeding and providing assistance falls under
the comity principle.25 Therefore, the Hong Kong court will likely recognize the New Zealand
proceeding. Just like Singapore, however, the decision to recognize the proceeding does not
necessarily lead to HKLoanCo receiving more than its initial share of the bankruptcy award.
V.

Type of Proceeding
a. United States: Foreign Main Proceeding

After the judge recognizes the proceeding, the judge determines the type of foreign
proceeding. Chapter 15 explicitly states two options for the type of proceeding including main and
nonmain, but the case law has also shown that a proceeding could fall under neither category.26
Each classification drastically changes a judge’s approach to the case which affects the relevant
bankruptcy protections in Chapter 15.

24

Insolvency and directors' duties in Hong Kong: overview by John Robert Lees, JLA Asia Limited
Joint Official Liquidators of A Company v B and C [2014] 4 HKLRD 374.
26
In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Master Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff'd, 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
25
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i. DroneCo
For the United States’ CPDrone, Chapter 15 would allow the court to recognize the New
Zealand proceeding as a foreign main proceeding. The court would look at DroneCo’s “center of
main interest” (“COMI”) to determine the type of proceeding. DroneCo’s COMI is definitely in
New Zealand because Bird controls the company and the manufacturing occurs there. The court
would recognize the New Zealand insolvency as a foreign main proceeding.
b. Singapore and Hong Kong: By Order of the Court
Hong Kong and Singapore do not have specific insolvency statutes for distributing assets
independent of a company. However, the territories still allow the creditors to initiate involuntary
proceedings to obtain a claim on the assets. HKLoanCo and SingLoanCo will initiate the court
ordered winding up procedure.27 Both judges should accept the applications due to DroneCo’s
inability to repay its debt.
VI.

Winding up

The drastically different approaches to the steps leading to winding up result in each
territory distributing the CPDrones in various ways. For winding up, the major discrepancy among
the cross-border insolvency regimes still occurs at the starting point of recognizing the foreign
insolvency proceedings and leads to different outcomes for the creditors.

27

Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) s 253(b), 254(e); Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions)
Ordinance (Cap 32) § 179(1) (2016)
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a. United States
Chapter 15 provides the communication and cooperation required to find an equitable
division of assets. On the request of the New Zealand foreign representative, the court would place
the USDrone under the jurisdiction of the New Zealand main proceeding.
b. Singapore
Singapore’s territorial statutes should provide a different outcome compared to the United
States’ cooperation, but the judges’ dedication to common law principles leads to surprisingly
similar results. Singapore’s Companies Act technically requires ring-fencing for foreign
companies and a preference for the creditors incorporated within Singapore before any other
division of assets.28 However, two major cases have held that debtors are no longer bound by the
ring-fencing obligation.29 The court’s recent refusal to require ring-fencing makes Singapore
cross-border insolvency statute more similar to modified universalism than territorialism.
Therefore, a Singaporean court will likely place SingDrone under the jurisdiction of the New
Zealand main proceeding.
c. Hong Kong
While Hong Kong utilizes a modified universalism approach for cross-border insolvencies,
courts are limited by the insolvency statutes’ strict interpretations of foreign proceedings. A court
has little power to rule differently in cross-border cases because it must apply the same approach
regardless of whether other liquidations are occurring.30 Recognizing and supporting foreign
liquidators does not hurt Hong Kong creditors in the same way as pooling together the assets owed

28

Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed) s 377(3)(c)
See Beluga Chartering GmBH (in liquidation) and others v Beluga Projects (Singapore) Pte Ltd (in liquidation
and another [2014] 2 SLR 815); Re Opti-medix (in liquidation) [2016] SGHC 108
30
China Medical Technologies Inc, [2014] 2 HKLRD 997
29
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to a Hong Kong creditor. The court wants to protect the rights of HKLoanCo over providing an
equitable division of assets.
d. Distribution of Assets
Under the New Zealand proceeding, the court has the jurisdiction to sell DroneCo’s
remaining drones and materials, including USDrone and SingDrone, which will greatly increase
the price of the bidding. The Hong Kong court would likely not place the HKDrone under the
jurisdiction of the New Zealand court.
e. Sale of Assets
Competition between OpenSesame and Bezos had been fierce for the assets under the New
Zealand proceeding, but OpenSesame won. OpenSesame paid $8 million for the New Zealand
insolvency assets, and the New Zealand court provided an equitable division of those assets.
Overall, UCLoanCo and USLoanCo were owed $24 million from their loans. Each bank received
33 cents on the dollar for their loans, which led to USLoanCo receiving $1 million. OpenSesame
wanted to prevent Bezos from obtaining the innovative drone technology, so it bid $2 million for
the HKDrone in the Hong Kong proceeding.
Both Hong Kong and Singapore courts would have the HKDrone and SingDrone go
directly to repaying HKLoanCo and SingLoanCo for the loans the companies made to DroneCo.
HKLoanCo and SingLoanCo would receive the entire $2 million, and no other money would go
to UCLoanCo. Compared to the universalism system in the United States, HKLoanCo would
receive twice the money of USLoanCo and SingLoanCo because they need not share the
insolvency award with any other creditor.

17

VII.

Singapore’s Adoption of the Model Law

Switching gears, this paper will now turn to the current and potential policy changes of the
territories’ cross-border insolvency regimes. Analyzing a territory’s transnational insolvency
system reveals the rationale behind potential and implemented policy changes.
a. Pros and Cons of Switching to the Model Law
On March 30, 2017, Singapore incorporated a radical change in its insolvency regime by
ratifying the Companies Amendment Bill, which adopted the Model Law.31 At first glance,
Singapore would lose many benefits from adopting a universalism system. When changing an
entrenched statutory regime, all countries must overcome losing the longstanding precedent and
the political inertia required to make an enormous switch. However, Singapore’s small population
of six million people and one-party political system provide the ideal circumstances to quickly and
easily switch from an ingrained system.
Another major benefit of switching to the Model Law is the reduction in forum shopping
for the best insolvency laws. The Senior Minister of State for Law stated that the huge variety in
cross-border insolvency laws across jurisdictions contributed to the complexity of these cases. 32
The Judicial Commissioner also stated that traditional insolvency laws were developed with a
domestic focus and, therefore, created uncertain results for cross-border insolvencies.33 By

31

Companies (Amendment) Act (Cap 50, 2017 Rev Ed)
Speech by Senior Minister of State for Law, Indranee Rajah, at the Regional Insolvency Conference, (2014),
https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/minlaw/en/news/speeches/speech-by-sms-at-regional-insolvency-conf-2014.html
(last visited May 15, 2017).
33
Kannan Ramesh, Cross-Border Insolvencies: A New Paradigm,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/Data/Editor/Documents/IAIR%202016%20Speech_Ramesh%20JC_delivered.pdf
(last visited May 15, 2017).
32
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incorporating the Model Law, Singapore reduces the desirability of forum shopping for crossborder insolvencies and provides more consistent and predictable outcomes.
Additionally, Singapore is one of the few nations that utilizes the common law system; the
nearby Asian countries rely on the civil law system. Singapore’s switch to the Model Law will
further complicate the insolvency procedures with its neighbors. But, Singapore has its sights on
becoming the primary jurisdiction for commercial transactions throughout the world. Detailing
some of Singapore’s recent changes to become the world’s center of international commercial
disputes and transactions provides context for Singapore’s adoption of the Model Law.
b. Singapore’s Dedication to Becoming a Financial Center
My trip to Singapore included several discussions with executives from the Singapore
International Arbitration Center and Singapore International Mediation Center. 34 Both people
discussed Singapore’s decision to increase its presence as the world’s center for international
disputes through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and other legislative changes. The
speakers argued that Singapore has consciously determined to turn itself into a “hub”—a word I
heard from multiple speakers throughout the trip—for all commercial transactions. Christopher
Bloch, my contact at the Singapore International Arbitration Center, believed that any country’s
corporate laws were only as strong as its weakest link, and companies would hesitate to enter the
Singaporean market due to its small size.
One of Singapore’s most innovative creations is the Singapore International Commercial
Court (“SICC”). SICC provides jurisdiction over any claim of “international and commercial

34

I spoke with Christopher Bloch who is the Associate Counsel and Business Development Manager at the
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International Mediation Center.
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nature.”35 The provision allows SICC to adjudicate any international dispute if both parties agree
to appear in the court which provides a substitute to alternative dispute resolution unseen in other
countries. SICC also allows foreign lawyers registered with the court to try cases and bypass the
typical licensing process.36 Singapore prides itself on the efficiency and sophistication of its
judiciary. By striving to become a hub for international disputes and transactions, Singapore’s
cross-border insolvency regime could not continue to isolate itself from the rest of the world.
Switching to the Model Law allows Singapore the ability to present itself as a hub of international
transactions from cradle to grave.
Singapore’s government rationalized the change in similar ways to the United States’
Chapter 15 views. The Second Reading Speech—the penultimate step of turning a bill into law—
explains that the main reasons behind the change were “[g]reater certainty of outcome and
significantly enhance[ing] Singapore’s capability in dealing with cross-border insolvencies.”37 The
country’s stated reasoning behind adopting the Model Law is only one reason for the switch from
territoriality to universalism.
c. Other Rationales behind Adoption of the Model Law
In Singapore, I spoke with Chong Kah Kheng, an insolvency partner at Rajah & Tann, one
of the largest law firms in Singapore. Our discussion helped provide further context for
Singapore’s decision to formally switch to the Model Law because of the country’s dedication to
limit uncertain results and increase investments.
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Both the United States and Singapore’s adoptions of the Model Law explicitly state the
desire for legal certainty in resolving cross-border insolvencies.38 Chong believes that, because
businesses are becoming increasingly global, Singapore’s decision to adopt the Model Law
occurred as a natural evolution after relying on uncertain common law principles. Additionally, he
believed that the Model Law would boost Singapore’s slowing economy by encouraging further
investments.
Adopting the Model Law signals to investors and companies that legal certainty and
economic focus are important. Singapore’s dedication to becoming a hub for international
transactions and commerce incentivizes the country to improve its economic policy. My trip
emphasized the importance of the country’s legal structure. Yet, others believed that the key to
Singapore’s current and future success depended directly on the economic policy itself.
d. Singapore’s Other Advantages
I spoke with David Adelman, the former United States’ ambassador to Singapore, and
heard his perspective on possible factors that affect Singapore’s cross-border insolvency compared
to Hong Kong.39 He argued that investors valued certain financial aspects in Singapore compared
to other Asian markets, and bankruptcy falls near the bottom of that list. The most important factors
for investors are the monetary authority of Singapore, Singapore’s government, the long track
record of an independent judiciary, and a favorable tax regime.
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the Model Law.
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Ambassador Adelman noted that Singapore is the fifth largest recipient of foreign direct
investment (“FDI”) in the world and third in Asia. Western investors pour more money into
Singapore than any other Asian country, even after accounting for the differences in the size of the
economy.40 However, the other two Asian recipients—Hong Kong and China—are boosted in
these rankings because they heavily invest in each other’s economies.41 The United States accounts
for 12% of Singapore’s FDI compared to 3.3% and 3% of Hong Kong and China’s FDI,
respectively. Accounting for the differences in the total dollars of FDI, Singapore remains ahead
of the other territories.
Ambassador Adelman also argued that Singapore has huge economic power despite its
small economy in terms of total GDP. Singapore has received invitations to the G20 Summit
Conference for the past seven years and has been the organizer for the Global Governance Group,
which is an informal meeting among non-G20 countries. Singapore’s efforts to become a hub for
commerce and international transactions likely led it to adopt the Model Law.
VIII. Hong Kong’s Potential Policy Changes
Hong Kong would want to move away from its modified universalism regime for the same
reasons as Singapore, but the Model Law’s inability to provide a solution for Hong Kong
insolvencies with China acts as a major deterrent. However, the adoption of the Model Law mostly
provides a signaling effect for investors, which can also be obtained through other methods.
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Singapore: Foreign investment, https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/singapore/foreigninvestment#fdi (last visited May 15, 2017).
41
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a. Hong Kong’s Other “Cross-Border” Insolvency Issue
While there is a border between Hong Kong and China, the Model Law does not recognize
it as a formal border.42 The Model Law recognizes insolvencies only among “foreign states,”
which does not describe the situation between Hong Kong and China. China’s current insolvency
law provides only a single statute regarding cross-border insolvencies, and it applies only to cases
involving a foreign state.43 China has been increasing its political influence within Hong Kong and
would not want to acknowledge differences between the two territories.
Hong Kong could adopt an additional amendment to clarify insolvencies between Hong
Kong and China, but the amendment would not represent Hong Kong’s best interests. For example,
China has difficulty recognizing Hong Kong liquidators and receivers.44 On my trip, multiple
experts on the “one country, two systems” principle explained that Hong Kong is trying to maintain
its independence from China.45 Hong Kong would not create an amendment that provides
insolvency rights similar to a single country, and China would not accept a law that solidifies a
difference between the two territories. The judicial system in China is more corrupt than Hong
Kong’s judicial system,46 so any additional power for China’s judges results in a net loss for Hong
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Kong residents. Given the political capital and effort required to switch to the Model Law, Hong
Kong is unlikely to change soon.
b. Increased Adoption of Insolvency Protocols
International insolvency protocols provide a framework for communication and
cooperation among courts in cross-border insolvencies to harmonize proceedings before conflicts
arise. Hong Kong has been willing to recognize international insolvency protocols to counteract
the statutory limitations for cross-border insolvencies.47 Liquidators set up the framework, which
encourages the success of the insolvency through cooperation.48 Protocols provide one of the best
methods for organizing large cross-border insolvencies, but they have been used only for single
cases.49 International insolvency protocols assist the largest cross-border insolvencies, but they act
only as a substitute until legislative reforms occur.
Yet, several jurisdictions including, Singapore, the Southern District of New York, and
Delaware, have adopted the Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation between Courts in
Cross-border Insolvency Matters ("Guidelines").50 The Guidelines provide more cooperation
between courts than insolvency protocols. The Guidelines represent the first time a courts adopted
a common framework, and they become more effective when other jurisdictions adopt them.51 For
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Hong Kong, incorporating the Guidelines could function as a compromise between issues with
China over adopting the Model Law and keeping a modified territoriality regime.
IX.

Clarification of the United States’ COMI Analysis

The United States need not implement drastic amendments of the Model Law, but it could
greatly improve its efficiency and predictability by clarifying the COMI analysis. The COMI
analysis was straight-forward for DroneCo, but it has the potential to be one of the most confusing
aspects of cross-border insolvencies. Since the United States has already instituted the Model Law,
a complete overhaul of Chapter 15 would not make sense. However, Chapter 15 could improve its
structure by clarifying the COMI analysis and its rebuttal.
a. Grounding the COMI Analysis
Chapter 15 provides little guidance for judges to determine the company’s COMI. The
United States can improve cross-border insolvency efficiency and predictability—two of the main
rationales behind Chapter 15—by further clarifying COMI. One major problem for the COMI
analysis is that the phrase does not appear in other United States statutes.
A few United States bankruptcy courts have felt more comfortable equating COMI with
“principle place of business,” a common term in corporate law.52 Absent conflicting evidence,
courts start with the presumption that the debtor’s COMI is the location of its main office. 53 An
easy solution is to explicitly equate “center of main interests” with “principal place of business,”
a phrase prevalent in corporate law. COMI does not fit perfectly into principal place of business,
but allowing judges to cite the more established case law would reduce confusion.
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See e.g., In re Tri-Cont'l Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 629 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006)
11 U.S.C.A. § 1516(c)
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b. Specifying Factors for the COMI Rebuttal
Rebutting the COMI analysis has been difficult for courts. The analysis begins with the
assumption that the debtor’s COMI is “the debtor’s registered office.”54 Courts have struggled
with the factors necessary to refute the COMI assumption, as some decisions rely only on the
debtor’s factors while others include creditors’ concerns. Another solution could involve simply
listing the evidence required to rebut the COMI presumption. For example in In re SPhinX, the
court listed several debtor and creditor factors relevant to change the debtor’s COMI away from
its registered office:
“[T]he location of the debtor's headquarters; the location of those who
actually manage the debtor (which, conceivably could be the headquarters of a
holding company); the location of the debtor's primary assets; the location of the
majority of the debtor's creditors or of a majority of the creditors who would be
affected by the case; and/or the jurisdiction whose law would apply to most
disputes”
Other courts have taken different approaches for rebutting the COMI analysis.55 Regardless
of the actual factors, Chapter 15 would greatly benefit from explicitly stating the elements involved
in rebutting the debtor’s COMI assumption.
X.

Conclusion

Rising globalization leads to corporations finding themselves increasingly susceptible to
countries’ cross-border insolvency regimes. In theory, universalism provides the most efficient
method of distributing the assets of a cross-border insolvency. But as demonstrated by DroneCo,
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the concept can break down when other countries do not follow. Each territory representing the
cross-border insolvency regimes takes a different approach to cross-border insolvency procedures.
While Singapore’s old regime appears more territorial, the country’s judges have relied
upon the common law to effectively shoehorn universalism and equally distributing assets. The
United States’ use of the Model Law predictably results in a universalistic approach to the
distribution of assets as well. Surprisingly, Hong Kong’s modified universalism is more stringent
than expected and results in a regime closer to territoriality.
As David Adelman stated, a country’s insolvency regime may be so far down the list of
factors for deciding to enter the market that it would not change the investment analysis for a
company. While cross-border insolvency statutes are important for companies, they likely care
more about other economic policies that affect the corporation. Singapore’s recent adoption of the
Model Law suggests that the most important consequence of its adoption might be the signaling
effect to investors about the country’s legal and political framework. Even if globalization
continues its pace, there are natural limits for insolvency as it must balance between local customs
and practices. Companies will face more cross-border insolvency issues as they become more
global, and countries which have created clear cross-border insolvency statutes will benefit.
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